By
Tyler Moran, NILC Employment Policy
Analyst, and
Joan Friedland, NILC Staff
Attorney
The Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act
of 2006 (S 2611), which the U.S. Senate passed on May 25, 2006,
would create a new Electronic Employment Verification System (EEVS)
for checking the employment eligibility of every newly hired worker
in the United States. The new EEVS would build on the Basic Pilot
program, which is a
voluntary, Internet-based employment eligibility verification system
currently used by approximately 10,000 employers.
Numerous proposals to
create a mandatory EEVS have been introduced in Congress, and an
EEVS is viewed by Republicans and Democrats alike as one of the
essential immigration enforcement measures to be included in any
comprehensive immigration reform proposal. The assumption is that
tighter controls at the worksite will decrease unauthorized
employment in the U.S. However, unless an EEVS is accompanied by
the legalization of undocumented workers already in the U.S. and
increased enforcement of labor and employment law, it will simply
result in an expansion of the underground economy and further
exploitation of low-wage workers.
The enforcement-without-reform policy of the last 20 years has been
a resounding failure: 7.2 million unauthorized workers are
currently employed in the U.S., representing almost 5 percent of the
civilian labor force.
Our economy depends on low-wage labor,
and undocumented workers perform low-skill, low-wage jobs. An
enforcement-only approach, without legalization, will only drive
unauthorized workers into the underground cash economy, resulting in
potentially billion-dollar losses in federal, state, and local tax
revenues. Moreover, weak enforcement of labor and employment laws
has allowed unscrupulous employers to manipulate immigration law to
punish workers seeking to enforce their labor rights. Many
unscrupulous employers knowingly violate the law to hire
undocumented workers who they know will be reluctant to hold them
accountable for labor law violations.
Furthermore, the Basic Pilot, upon which
most EEVS proposals are based, has been plagued by problems since
its inception in 1997. Most notably, the program, which is used
only by a relatively small number of employers, has been hindered by
inaccurate and outdated information in the Dept. of Homeland
Security (DHS) and Social Security Administration (SSA) databases,
lack of adequate privacy protections, and misuse of the program by
employers. Although S 2611 includes important worker protections
that address many of the inadequacies of the Basic Pilot,
implementation of an enforcement-only system without increased
enforcement of labor and employment laws would further exacerbate
the existing problems and create additional incentives for
unscrupulous employers to recruit, hire, and exploit unauthorized
workers.
Background: The Current Employment Eligibility Verification
System
The "I-9 system" is the current
employment eligibility verification system that has been in place
since the enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 (IRCA), which made it unlawful for employers in the U.S. to
"knowingly" hire employment-ineligible workers. Under this system,
all employers are required by law to verify, within three days of
hire, new employees' documents that establish their identification
and employment eligibility. Employers may accept any combination of
specified documents (listed on the reverse side of the Form I‑9) as
long as the documents appear genuine on their face and appear to
correspond to the employee presenting them. Employers that violate
the law are subject to penalties known as "employer sanctions."
The Basic Pilot is an Internet-based
program that allows employers to electronically verify workers'
employment eligibility by directly checking the records maintained
by DHS and SSA. As its name suggests, it is a pilot program,
created by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), that began operating in six
states in 1997. In Dec. 2004, Congress extended the Basic Pilot to
all 50 states, and it is now available to employers who voluntarily
choose to participate in it, although employers who have been found
to have unlawfully hired unauthorized workers or discriminated
against workers on the basis of national origin or citizenship
status may be required to participate.
Employers who participate in the Basic
Pilot are required to enter a new employee's Social Security number
(SSN) and proof of identity and employment eligibility into a form
in a government website within three days of hire. The information
is initially checked against SSA's
Numerical Identification file (NUMIDENT). If SSA can confirm
the person's employment eligibility, the employer will receive a
"confirmation" notice. If SSA is unable to confirm a U.S.
citizen's employment eligibility, the employer will receive a
"tentative nonconfirmation" notice. Citizens
can then contest the finding with SSA. If SSA is unable to confirm
a non-U.S. citizen's employment eligibility, the information
is forwarded to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to
be checked against its database. SSA and/or USCIS are required to
respond to the employer within three working days with a
"confirmation" or "tentative nonconfirmation" notice. If the person
receives a "tentative nonconfirmation" notice, he or she has eight
federal working days to appeal the decision.
The major difference between the I-9
system and the Basic Pilot is that under the I-9 system, the
employer has to certify on the I-9 form that the documents presented
by the employee appear to be genuine, and the employer must retain
such information in its files. Under the Basic Pilot, the employer
must receive confirmation from SSA and/or USCIS that the information
presented by the individual matches records maintained by SSA or
USCIS.
Overview of the Electronic Employment Verification System
Proposed in S 2611
Title III of S 2611 would expand the
Basic Pilot program and replace the I‑9 system with the EEVS, that
would be mandatory for all employers in the U.S. Section 301 of the
bill is a complete revision of section 274A of the INA (8 USC
§ 1324a). Like the Basic Pilot, the new EEVS would require
confirmation from SSA and/or USCIS that the information presented by
the worker to the employer matches records maintained by SSA and/or
USCIS. Under S 2611, the new EEVS would be implemented with respect
to new hires 18 months after the date that at least $400
million have been appropriated and made available to DHS for
implementation of the EEVS. However, the secretary of DHS would
have the authority to require "critical" employers (i.e., deemed so
based on an assessment of homeland security or national security
needs) and employers that the DHS secretary has reasonable cause to
believe have engaged in material violations related to unlawful
employment of immigrants to use the EEVS to verify the employment
eligibility of all their employees before the 18-month
period.
How the new system would work
Employers would be required to use the
EEVS to seek confirmation of a worker's identity and employment
eligibility not later than three days after the worker's date of
hire. Workers would have to present proof of identity to the
employer as follows: lawful permanent residents would be required
to present a permanent resident card; all other
work-authorized immigrants would be required to present an
employment authorization document (EAD); and U.S. citizens would
have to present a U.S. passport or a driver's license or ID card
that complies with requirements in the REAL ID Act. In addition
to obtaining an identification document from the newly hired worker,
the employer would also have to obtain the following: (1) the
worker's name and date of birth, and, if the worker was born in the
U.S., the name of the state in which the person was born; (2) the
worker's SSN; (3) the employer identification number (EIN) of the
worker's employer during any one of the five most recently completed
calendar years (the former employer would be required to provide the
EIN upon request from the worker); and (4) if the newly hired worker
does not attest that he or she is a U.S. national, an "alien
identification or authorization number." The bill also would
authorize the DHS secretary to require an employer to certify that
the employer is in compliance with these requirements if the
secretary has "reasonable cause" to believe that the employer is not
in compliance. The secretary would publish standards and methods
for certification in the Federal Register.
As laid out in S 2611, from this point
the EEVS would work as follows: After the employer submits the
worker's information to the EEVS, the system must provide a response
no later than 10 days after the inquiry. A "confirmation" indicates
that SSA and/or USCIS have verified that the worker is eligible for
employment. A "tentative nonconfirmation" indicates that the
records maintained by SSA and/or USCIS do no match the information
submitted by the worker to the employer, and that further
investigation is necessary. If the employer receives a tentative
nonconfirmation, the employer must, not later than three days after
receiving the notice, provide the worker a written notice that
includes the following: (1) information about the reason for the
notice; (2) the right to contest the notice; (3) contact information
for the appropriate agency and "instructions for initiating such
contest"; and (4) a 24-hour toll-free number to respond to inquiries
related to the notice. (This written notice is to be developed by
the DHS secretary and is to be made available to employers "in a
language other than English, as necessary and reasonable.")
The worker then has 10 days to submit
clarifying information to SSA or USCIS to contest the finding. The
employer cannot take adverse action against the worker during this
time. If the worker does not contest the tentative nonconfirmation
within 10 days of receiving it, the nonconfirmation becomes final
and the employer must fire the worker.
A worker's failure to contest a tentative
nonconfirmation would not be considered an admission that he or she
is not employment-eligible. However, employers would be required to
report any information relating to the worker that the DHS secretary
determines would assist the enforcement or administration of
immigration laws.
If a final confirmation or
nonconfirmation is not issued by the DHS secretary within 30 days
after the worker contests a tentative nonconfirmation, the worker
will automatically be confirmed as employment-authorized — and in
the interim, the employer may not fire the worker based on a
suspicion that the worker is not employment-eligible. This
employment-authorized status will remain in effect either (1) during
any continuous period of employment, unless the DHS secretary
determines that the worker committed identity fraud, or (2) during
the period that a person is temporarily authorized to be employed.
The process of issuing an automatic (or "default") confirmation will
remain in effect until the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
can certify that the EEVS can issue a final confirmation of
employment eligibility to workers who are eligible for employment
within 30 days of the initial inquiry at least 99 percent of the
time.
Antidiscrimination, due process, and privacy
protections in the proposed EEVS
The EEVS proposed in S 2611 includes
important due process, antidiscrimination and privacy protections.
The DHS secretary, in consultation with the SSA commissioner, would
be charged with establishing a process to permit workers who contest
an EEVS decision, or who seek to verify their own employment
eligibility, to contact the appropriate agency to correct or update
information in the EEVS in a "timely manner." The bill also
provides for an administrative and judicial review process where
workers who are fired due to incorrect information contained in the
EEVS could challenge the decision. If it were found that the worker
was fired due to an error in the EEVS, the worker would be entitled
to compensation for wages lost (calculated based on the wage rate
and work schedule that prevailed prior to termination) beginning on
the first scheduled work day after employment was terminated and
ending 180 days after completion of the administrative or judicial
review process or the day after the worker was reinstated or
obtained employment elsewhere, whichever occurred first. However,
attorney's fees and costs could not be recovered.
The bill also would expand section 274B
of the INA relating to unfair immigration-related employment
practices to explicitly apply to employment decisions related to the
new EEVS. Specifically, it would make it an unfair
immigration-related employment practice to (1) terminate or take
adverse action against a worker based on a tentative nonconfirmation
notice, including during the appeal period; (2) use the EEVS for
screening of an applicant prior to an offer of employment; (3) use
the EEVS for current employees beyond the first three days of their
hire, or for employment eligibility reverification of an employee
who has satisfied the EEVS requirements; or (4) require a worker to
make an inquiry under the self-verification procedures. The bill
also would limit the information that the EEVS could collect and
maintain to the minimum data necessary to operate the system; would
make it a misdemeanor for anyone to willfully and knowingly collect
and maintain data that is not required under the system; and would
make it a felony to knowingly access, disclose, or use any
information in the EEVS for the purpose of (a) committing identify
fraud or assisting another person in committing identify fraud, or
(b) unlawfully obtaining employment, or (c) for any purpose other
than provided for under any provision of law.
Additional antidiscrimination protections
S 2611 would expand the categories of
non–U.S. citizens who are covered by the INA's anti–citizenship
status discrimination provision, section 274B, to include all
lawful permanent residents, persons granted temporary residence,
refugees, asylees, persons granted temporary protected status (TPS),
nonimmigrants under the H-2C temporary guest worker program that
would be created by S 2611, and persons granted parole into the
U.S. The current definition of a "protected individual" under
section 274B excludes long-term LPRs, TPS beneficiaries, parolees,
and temporary workers. In addition,
the bill would authorize $40 million for the Office of Special
Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices (OSC),
part of the Dept. of Justice's Civil Rights Division, to conduct an
information campaign for each fiscal year during the 2007–09 period.
The bill also would increase the fines
employers are subjected to for engaging in unfair
immigration-related employment practices, such as national origin
and citizenship status discrimination, "document abuse" (which
occurs when an employer requires that a worker present more or
different documents than the those required under the law), and
retaliation, as follows: (1) civil penalties may range from $1,000
to $4,000 for each individual discriminated against; (2) employers
who have previously violated the law once are subject to a civil
penalty ranging from $4,000 to $10,000 for each individual
discriminated against; (3) employers who have previously violated
the law more than once are subject to a civil penalty ranging from
$6,000 to $20,000 for each individual discriminated against; and (4)
employers who commit "document abuse" are subject to a civil penalty
ranging from $500 to $5,000 for each individual discriminated
against.
Disclosure of tax identity information
New requirements regarding
information-sharing among the Internal Revenue Service, SSA and DHS
are also included in S 2611. Upon written request, SSA would have
to provide to DHS (1) employer taxpayer identity information
(name, mailing address, and taxpayer identifying number) if the
employer has filed Wage and Tax Statements (Forms W‑2) that have
more than 100 names that do not match SSA records or more than 10
employees with the same SSN; (2) taxpayer identity information of
employers who filed W-2s when SSA believes there is identity
fraud due to multiple persons filing returns of the same taxpayer
identifying number; (3) taxpayer identity information of
employers who filed W-2s when SSA believes they are not
participating in the EEVS; (4) taxpayer identity information of
new employees of employers whom SSA believes are not
participating in the EEVS; (5) taxpayer identity information of
all employees of employers required to participate in the EEVS
because they are critical infrastructure employers or because of
previous violations of employment eligibility requirements; and (6)
taxpayer identity information for new employees of employers
participating in the EEVS. Disclosure would be restricted to
establishing and enforcing employer participation in the EEVS,
enforcement of certain provisions of the INA, and the civil
operation of the Alien Terrorist Removal Court.
The bill would authorize an annual
increase (subject to appropriations) of not less then 2,200 ICE
personnel for a 5-year period. It also would require DHS to ensure
that not less then 25 percent of all hours expended by all ICE
personnel are used for immigration enforcement at the worksite.
Under the bill, an "employer compliance fund" also would be created
that would collect all civil monetary penalties for unauthorized
employment of immigrants. These funds would be used for enhancing
and enforcing employer compliance with the law.
Assessment and reporting requirements
Finally, the bill would require the DHS
secretary to submit to Congress annual reports that include an
assessment of whether the EEVS is able to correctly issue, within 30
days, a final confirmation notice in at least 99 percent of the
cases in which the final notice relates to a worker who is
employment-authorized, and a certification of such assessment. It
also would require the GAO to conduct annual studies and submit to
Congress annual reports that evaluate the accuracy, integrity, and
impact of the EEVS. The reports would also have to include, at
minimum, the following: (1) an assessment of DHS's annual report
and certification regarding database accuracy; (2) an assessment of
EEVS performance with respect to the rate at which workers who are
eligible for employment are correctly approved within 30 days,
including a separate assessment of such rate for nationals and
immigrants; (3) an assessment of the privacy and security of the
EEVS and its effects on identity theft or misuse of private data;
(4) an assessment of the impact of the EEVS on the employment of
unauthorized workers; (5) an assessment of the effects of the EEVS,
including the effects of tentative nonconfirmations on unfair
immigration-related employment practices and employment
discrimination based on national origin or citizenship status; and
(6) an assessment of whether DHS and SSA have adequate resources to
carry out the EEVS.
Analysis of the EEVS Proposed in S 2611
Creating a mandatory EEVS represents a
significant shift in the way that workers in the U.S. will seek
employment. To secure employment under the proposed system, workers
will first have to be approved by the federal government as
employment-eligible, whereas now employers determine whether or not
a new hire is employment-eligible based on the documents the worker
presents. Although the EEVS proposed in S 2611 includes important
worker protections that do not exist in other proposals, including
the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration
Control Act of 2005 (HR 4437) that
passed the U.S. House of Representatives last December, the massive
expansion of the Basic Pilot, and converting it into a mandatory and
permanent program, will likely have a disparate impact on immigrant
workers, while directly affecting all workers and disrupting the
flow of business.
New documentation requirements
The provision that would eliminate from
the current list of acceptable identity documents all but one type
of document is likely to prolong the hiring process. Current law
allows workers to choose from among a range of acceptable documents
one document to prove their identity. This flexibility recognizes
the fact that not all work-authorized individuals have the same
documents. Under S 2611, lawful permanent residents would be
allowed to present only their permanent resident (or "green") card,
and all other work-authorized noncitizens would be allowed to
present only an employment authorization document.
This restriction ignores the lengthy time
it takes new LPRs, and those who have lost their green cards, to
obtain new green cards and EADs. Sole reliance on the EAD is
extremely limiting, and it is certain that the lengthy process
required to obtain and subsequently renew EADs will causes delays in
employment. Certain categories of immigrants — such as refugees,
asylees, and people granted TPS — have authorization to work
incident to their immigration status, and people in some of these categories are
considered work-authorized whether or not they have EADs. For
example, LPRs and asylees are eligible to be employed
in the U.S., whether or not they have EADs. In such cases,
requiring an EAD would compel workers to incur the time and expense
of obtaining one they would not otherwise need and similarly burden
the agency with having to issue additional unnecessary documents.
Generally, EADs are issued for a one-year
period and require the payment of a fee each time they are initially
obtained and renewed. An expiration date on an EAD may merely
indicate that the card has expired, but not that authorization to
work has expired. For example, the expiration date of an asylee's
EAD indicates only that the document must be renewed but not that
the asylee's work authorization has expired. The
expiration date of EADs issued to persons granted TPS is often the
date announced in a notice published in the Federal Register, not
the date actually printed on the EAD.
The EAD requirement may cause delays in
employment or perhaps even lapses in employment due to DHS backlogs
and other errors in processing EADs. While workers with EADs are
advised to apply for renewals 90 days prior to their expiration
date, often the DHS is unable to issue the new EAD within the 90-day
period. Other problems with EAD renewals include DHS losing
applications for renewal and/or failing to actually send the EAD to
the applicant after processing the renewal application. Other
categories of immigrants simply are not issued EADs at all because
they are authorized to be employed only by a particular employer.
Under the proposed system, to prove their
identity U.S. citizens would be allowed to present only a U.S.
passport, or a driver's license or ID card that complies with
requirements in the REAL ID Act. However, the REAL ID Act's
requirements will not take effect until May 2008 at the earliest,
and when they do take effect, many U.S. citizens — both foreign-born
and native-born — will not be eligible for a REAL ID–compliant
license or ID. In addition to the practical considerations, sole
reliance on a REAL ID document moves us closer to the framework for
a national ID system, which raises grave civil liberties and civil
rights concerns. The bill would allow the DHS secretary to
designate other documents as proof of identification, but they are
not specified in the legislation.
In addition, a last-minute provision
included in the bill would require workers to also submit the
employer identification number of their former employer as
part of the verification process. While the employer would be
required by law to provide the EIN to the worker, the burden to
actually obtain it would inevitably fall on the worker, who would
not be able to obtain future employment without first obtaining this
number. This provision also raises
substantial privacy concerns for small employers — including family
businesses — whose EIN is often their SSN.
The intent of this provision is to combat identity fraud by
creating another piece of information to verify, but the practical
implication of the requirement, if it becomes law, is that it will
make it more difficult for workers to obtain employment.
The default confirmation
One important provision in the Senate's
EEVS proposal is the creation of an automatic, or "default,"
confirmation in the case where DHS does not issue a finding on a
worker's employment eligibility within 30 days after the person
contests a tentative nonconfirmation. The default confirmation
remains in place until the GAO can certify that the EEVS can issue a
final confirmation of work eligibility to workers who are eligible
for employment within 30 days of the initial inquiry at least 99
percent of the time. This provision is significant because once a
worker challenges a tentative nonconfirmation under the Basic Pilot,
the burden is on the worker to prove that there is an error in the
system — even though the primary reason for nonconfirmations is
delays in entry of employment authorization information into DHS
databases.
While the default confirmation is an
important protection, it does not address the underlying problem
that the database upon which the EEVS would rely currently generates
a higher number of erroneous tentative nonconfirmations for
foreign-born noncitizens than it does for native-born workers. This is
important because while employers are prohibited from taking adverse
action against workers who receive a tentative nonconfirmation, a
2002 independent evaluation of the Basic Pilot found that 45 percent
of employees surveyed who contested a tentative nonconfirmation were
subject to pay cuts, delayed job training, and other restrictions on
working. And 73 percent of employees who should have been informed
of work authorization problems were not, thereby limiting their
ability to correct inaccurate nonconfirmation notices and continue
working. In
addition, the timeframe of 10 days to contest a tentative
nonconfirmation is inadequate. Under the Basic Pilot, workers have
had a difficult time meeting the 8-day deadline, particularly when
they need to obtain source documents to correct the discrepancy or
they live in rural areas far from a local USCIS or SSA office.
Worker protections in the proposed EEVS
The existence of an administrative and
judicial review process for workers who lose their jobs due to
errors in the EEVS is critically important. Specifically, if there
is a finding of an EEVS error, workers are entitled to compensation
that includes lost wages beginning on the first scheduled work day
after employment was terminated and ending 180 days after completion
of the administrative review process or the day after the worker is
reinstated or obtains employment elsewhere, whichever occurs first.
Unfortunately a provision to provide for attorneys' fees and costs
was stripped out at the last minute. This will make it difficult
for low-income immigrant workers to find representation and strain
the already limited resources of nonprofit organizations.
The 18-month timeline for implementation
of the EEVS is unrealistic — both from the perspective of DHS's
ability to manage the program and for employers to receive training
and equipment to participate in the EEVS. The EEVS is particularly
vulnerable to poor planning because of its unprecedented scope, and
the disconnect between the agency mandate to get something up and
running quickly and the requirements that would ultimately determine
whether it is successful, such as the need for speed, efficiency,
reliability, and information security. Even the House bill
(HR 4437) includes a longer phase-in of the program, with critical
infrastructure employers participating three years after enactment
and all other employers participating six years after enactment. In
the final Senate negotiations, a provision was added that prohibits
the EEVS from being implemented until 18 months after funds have
been appropriated and made available to DHS. While this provision
addresses DHS's critical need for resources, it does not address
DHS's limited ability to manage the program effectively.
DHS's record on managing previous
large-scale projects — including its delays in implementing the
US-VISIT program and the digitization of paper-based files —
demonstrates that the agency does not meet expectations if it is not
held accountable. One means of addressing agency accountability is
to set standards for system performance that must be met before the
system can be expanded. The Basic Pilot, which up until this year
was used by less than one-twentieth of one percent of all employers,
has had too many problems to afford any confidence that the DHS
could successfully resolve the over 55 million database queries per
year that would result from nationwide expansion.
Additional antidiscrimination protections
The bill takes an important step towards
strengthening the antidiscrimination protections of INA section 274B
by expanding the categories of immigrants who are eligible for
protection under the law and increasing fines for employers who
violate the law. The INA's antidiscrimination provision is the only
federal law that protects workers from workplace discrimination
based on citizenship or immigration status. However, current law
protects only workers who are U.S. citizens and nationals, asylees,
refugees, and some LPRs. It protects only those LPRs, who are not
yet eligible for naturalization and those who file for
naturalization within six months of becoming eligible to do so. The
Senate bill eliminates this restriction.
Despite this expansion of the
antidiscrimination protection, the categories of immigrants who
would be eligible for protection are incomplete. This section could
be further strengthened by allowing all employment-authorized
workers to file claims under section 274B, which would be consistent
with other types of claims, such as document abuse, under the
antidiscrimination provisions.
The terms under which an immigrant is
protected from citizenship status discrimination or document abuse
should also be expanded. Current law prohibits employers from
discriminating at the hiring, recruiting, or firing stages, but not
during the actual course of employment. The law should be amended
to clarify that workers are protected from discrimination during the
"terms and conditions" of their work, as is currently the case with
other civil rights laws.
The bill authorizes an additional $40
million for OSC to conduct an information campaign on the
antidiscrimination provisions in section 274B. These extra
resources are critical, as many workers are unaware of the
protections afforded them and there likely will be increased
instances of citizenship status discrimination with a mandatory
expansion of an EEVS.
Information-sharing requirements
The new information-sharing requirements
in the bill create exceptions to the confidentiality provisions in
the tax code by requiring SSA to disclose taxpayer identity
information of employers and employees to DHS, when DHS requests
this information. It is unclear how these provisions will be
interpreted or what process DHS will follow in using taxpayer
information for immigration enforcement purposes. Use of
confidential tax information to attempt to enforce immigration law
can have a clear affect on tax compliance and has the potential to
increase discrimination against foreign-looking or sounding
workers.
These information-sharing provisions are
an incursion into protections for confidentiality of tax information
provided by section 6103 of the tax code. The provisions pertaining
to employee information that doesn't match SSA records and identity
fraud give DHS access to employer tax identity information
simply by requesting it, but they do not give DHS access to
employee taxpayer identity information by a simple request. In
those cases, if DHS wanted information regarding employees to use
for immigration enforcement purposes, it would arguably have to
follow current procedures in the tax code which require a court
order.
The proposed language grants DHS access
to information regarding all employees of critical
infrastructure employers, yet it is unclear how critical
infrastructure will be defined (e.g., what industries and businesses
will be included). It is also unclear if employees in non–critical
infrastructure divisions of critical infrastructure employers
would be covered.
Disclosure of employers' taxpayer
identity information because SSA records indicate that more than 100
names and SSNs of their employees do not match SSA records may be
problematic. There are numerous reasons why employees' names and
SSNs might not match SSA records, including incorrect data entry,
name changes due to marriage or divorce, and misspelled names.
No-matches are not a proxy for unauthorized immigration status.
Rather, they indicate that workers are not receiving proper credit
for their earnings, which will affect the level of retirement or
disability benefits they may receive in the future. The no-match
provision does not even require that the employer be notified of the
discrepancy, nor does it provide an opportunity for either the
employer or employee to provide corrected information.
Disclosure of employers' taxpayer
identity information when SSA records indicate they have more than
10 employees with the same SSN is likewise problematic, since the
existence of such a situation does not necessarily indicate fraud.
Employers are instructed by the IRS to put 000-00-0000 on W-2s when
their employees have applied for SSNs but have not received them.
Advocates of information-sharing between IRS, SSA, and DHS
frequently cite the use of 000-00-000 as justification for the
breach of tax confidentiality rules, because they argue that using
all zeroes on a W-2 is an indication that a person is not
work-authorized. However, employers with high numbers of authorized
workers who don't yet have their SSNs would be flagged by SSA for
simply following the law.
It is likely that employers will become
fearful that they are in violation of immigration law when their
previously confidential tax information is revealed to DHS because
they have employees whose names and SSNs do not match SSA records or
because they have followed IRS instructions in using 000-00-0000 on
W-2s. The result is that employers will be overly cautious and fire
these employees. Already, thousands of workers have been fired due
to the mistaken assumption that an SSA no-match letter indicates an
immigration violation. In
addition, the new requirement may increase incidents of the SSA
no-match letter being used as a retaliation tool. Unscrupulous
employers already use the SSA no-match letter to stymie labor
organizing campaigns and to retaliate against workers who have been
injured on the job or who complain of unpaid wages or other labor
violations. There is also no indication that DHS makes good use of
earnings information it currently has available to it, nor that it
has a clear sense of what its future data needs will be and what
information will actually be useful for enforcement purposes.
Conclusion
The concept of an EEVS is one that enjoys
almost universal support in Congress because it is viewed as the key
to enforcement at the worksite. Yet lessons learned over the last
20 years that the current immigration enforcement system has been in
place demonstrate that without creating a meaningful path for
workers to legalize in this country and serious enforcement of labor
and employment law, the an enforcement-only approach is doomed to
fail. The Senate had an opportunity to vote on an amendment offered
by Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) to strengthen labor law — including a
provision that would have eliminated the conflict the Supreme Court
identified in its Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB
decision holding that undocumented workers are not entitled to a
back pay remedy for being illegally fired for union organizing under
the National Labor Relations Act — but the Senate leadership refused
to let it be voted on. Until labor and employment law is enforced,
unscrupulous employers will always seek out immigrant workers whom
they can exploit.