The petitioner, a Ms. Beltran, is a 50-year-old woman who has lived in the U.S. since 1968. Between 1972 and 1991, she used an assumed identity, Mary Lou Slavit, after finding Slavit’s SSN card on a bus.  Beltran used the SSN and assumed identity to obtain employment, marry twice, and obtain a driver’s license, credit cards, and a HUD loan.  However, in these actions she did not attempt to create any liability for the real Slavit, but rather established her own credit.

In 1988 when Slavit, in reviewing her Internal Revenue Service earnings records, learned what Beltran had been doing, she called Beltran at work and asked her to stop using her identity.  Beltran nonetheless continued to use the identity, and in 1991 she was arrested and convicted in federal court of using a false attestation on an I-9 employment eligibility verification form and of falsely representing an SSN.  Both offenses stemmed from her action in falsely using Slavit’s SSN on the I-9.  For this conviction, Beltran served 90 days in prison and was given 5 years’ probation.

In 1993 the INS began deportation proceedings against Beltran.  At her deportation hearing, she applied for registry, suspension of deportation, and voluntary departure.  The immigration judge denied all relief, and Beltran appealed.  The BIA also denied all three applications, finding that Beltran’s convictions were for crimes of moral turpitude and that she was therefore ineligible for any of the relief she sought.  The BIA also denied all three applications in the exercise of discretion.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit first found that its jurisdiction over the petition is governed by the transitional rules of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).  Under those rules, the court does not have jurisdiction to review discretionary denials of suspension of deportation and voluntary departure.  However, the court found that the transitional rules do not restrict its jurisdiction to review the denial of registry, and on this basis the court proceeded to review the BIA’s decision.

Applicants for registry must show that they have resided continuously in the U.S. since prior to Jan. 1, 1972, and that they are persons of "good moral character."  Had Beltran’s convictions been considered crimes of moral turpitude, they would have precluded her from meeting the good moral character requirement.  However, after analyzing the statutes under which Beltran was convicted, the court concluded that her offenses did not constitute crimes of moral turpitude.

The court found support for this conclusion in an action that Congress took in 1990, when it created a temporary exemption from the same kind of prosecution that resulted in Beltran’s conviction.  The exemption applied to immigrants who obtained lawful permanent resident status through legalization or registry and who falsely used an SSN solely so they could engage in otherwise lawful conduct.  Although Beltran did not qualify for this exemption (because her crimes were committed after the exemption’s expiration and she had not yet obtained LPR status), the court found that Congress’s creation of the exemption shows that these crimes do not amount to moral turpitude.  The court also found that Beltran’s acts were malum prohibitum (or statutorily prohibited), rather than malum in se (or inherently wrong), and for this reason as well, the crimes should not be considered to involve moral turpitude.

The court also reversed the BIA’s denial of registry in the exercise of discretion, finding that it was based on the erroneous conclusion that the convictions were for crimes of moral turpitude.  The Ninth Circuit therefore reversed the decision, remanded the case to the BIA, and ordered the latter to determine whether Beltran is eligible for and should be granted registry, in light of its decision.