In this case, the respondent was convicted in 1987 of third degree murder, a conviction that comes within the ADAA’s definition of an "aggravated felony."  But, as originally enacted, the ADAA provided that only individuals convicted of such crimes on or after the statute’s enactment were deportable.  This limitation on deportability applied even though the deportation statute itself had no express limitation, simply providing that "any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after entry is deportable."

The issue presented before the court was whether the reenactment of the aggravated felony ground of deportation achieved by the Immigration Act of 1990 eliminated the limit on deportability (i.e., that deportability may not be based on aggravated felonies committed prior to the ADAA’s enactment).  While the 1990 act expanded the aggravated felony definition and renumbered (but did not amend) the above-quoted deportation ground, the statute contains no explicit language rescinding the proscription against basing deportation on pre-ADAA convictions.

Nonetheless, the court concluded that the Board of Immigration Appeals’ interpretation of the 1990 act as superseding the 1988 restriction contained in the ADAA was reasonable.  Finding that the statutory language did not expressly resolve this issue, the court gave deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the statute.  In doing so, the court concluded that the 1990 act’s reenactment of the statutory ground of deportability based on convictions for aggravated felonies makes it applicable to such convictions regardless of when they were committed.